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HON. DAVE BREWER 
My Tribute to Jack 
hen I first worked with Jack Landau as a colleague at the Oregon 
Court of Appeals, I immediately realized that he was one of the 
smartest people I had ever known. Much more importantly, though, 
nineteen years later, when our daily work together was done, I knew 
that I had never seen a better judge. 
Jack joined the Oregon Court of Appeals in 1993, and he authored 
1137 majority opinions overall, more opinions per year throughout his 
eighteen-year tenure on that court than any judge in its history. During 
his time there, he wrote extensively on search-and-seizure law, 
statutory construction, and state constitutional history. He was tough 
but always fair with his observations about the state of the law, 
including when he sometimes rightly pointed out that constitutional 
law in Oregon was, putting it kindly, “a bit of a muddle.” 
He was revered on the Court of Appeals as a superb teacher and 
mentor, and he was beloved by his clerks, staff attorneys, and judicial 
assistants and colleagues. He always was focused, courteous, highly 
productive, possessed of a trenchant and self-effacing wit, and he had 
an unerring ability to follow the law to its logical conclusions, which 
made him hard to pigeonhole. For example, in Tanner v. Oregon 
Health Sciences University, he wrote the opinion for the court, which 
held that employers cannot discriminate against gay and lesbian 
couples when providing health benefits.1 That 1998 ruling was 
revolutionary at the time, and it electrified the left. By contrast, he 
pleased more conservative court-watchers with a holding that public 
sex acts are not constitutionally protected “speech.” 
What must be understood is that Jack never tried to please any 
particular group when he wrote an opinion. A good appellate judge, 
Jack has always believed, is first and foremost fair and impartial. Or as 
1 Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. U., 157 Or. App. 502, 971 P.2d 435 (1998). 
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he said it best, “The Court of Appeals isn’t a good place for anyone 
with an agenda.” In addition, he set a tone for hard work that nobody 
has ever touched. I’ll never forget him telling people that during his 
years on the bench he had read a stack of briefs more than twenty stories 
tall, until one of the staff attorneys corrected him, saying that it was 
more like thirty stories. He also understood that it was indispensable to 
be collegial. He explained that “appellate courts work in panels, so you 
must be able to get along well with your colleagues, even in the face of 
vigorous disagreement. Otherwise you’ll end up spending all your time 
writing nothing but dissents.” He also consistently embodied the 
virtues that a good appellate judge must have: a “passion for the law” 
and a love of writing. Because he practiced what he preached, he 
always achieved his paramount goal in opinion writing: “Whether or 
not you agreed with it, and you almost always did, you only had to read 
the opinion once to understand it.” 
If you’ll indulge me, I’d like to mention two of Jack’s greatest gifts 
to Oregon law and jurisprudence, gifts that we cannot afford to lose 
going forward. The first is epitomized by what he wrote in a 2012 
article about the thorniest problem of state constitutional interpretation: 
[I]n cases involving older rights provisions that are broad and open-
ended, courts will confront the problem of generalization; that is, at
what level of generality or specificity should the court describe the
principle that the wording and the history of a state constitutional
provision reveal? The problem, as I have earlier noted, is
unavoidable. Unless, for instance, a nineteenth-century right to bear
arms provision is to be limited to nineteenth-century weapons
technology—a position that I assume to be obviously untenable—
some sort of generalization is necessary to apply the provision to
modern circumstances. . . . I am not aware of anything about the
nature of state constitutions that intrinsically favors one approach
over another. What I do contend, however, is that, whatever a court
determines is the appropriate consideration or set of considerations
in deciding these hardest of hard cases, it should be candid about what
it is doing. Once again, my concern is legitimacy. Even in cases in
which rules fail . . . it seems to me important for courts to be
transparent about their reasoning. Because the principal rationale for
judicial review is that the interpretation of constitutions entails the
application of legal principles, courts should explain their
interpretive decisions, so that it is clear that they have a basis in
reason and not merely the personal policy preferences of the judges
involved. Moreover, because of the fact that so many state court
judges are elected, it becomes especially important for them to lay
bare their decisions in a candid way, so that those decisions may be
fairly evaluated by the electorate. Aside from that, candor in judicial
decision-making is critical to providing guidance to future litigants;
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if the decisions are being made for reasons other than those stated, 
then the stated reasons may serve only to lead future litigants astray.2 
Beautifully written and exactly right, but this isn’t just the way that 
Jack has talked to academic audiences throughout his career. It’s the 
way that he has walked the walk as a sitting judge. This insistence on 
transparency and the use of principled reason has been one of his great 
gifts to his colleagues, the lawyers and litigants who have appeared 
before him, his students, and the public that must live with our 
decisions.  
Jack’s second great gift has been staving off the erosion of legal 
history and the precision of language in the rule of law. Douglas Hyde 
once wrote that, if “our language wanes and dies, the golden legends of 
the far-off centuries will fade and pass away.”3 No one will see their 
influence on culture; no one will see their educational power. Hyde’s 
fear has never come to fruition on Jack’s watch. Jack has been a 
preeminent master of language and the import of words in judging, and 
he has always used the lessons of history to explain and guide the 
course of the law, without being shackled by anachronism.  
Consistent with those gifts, I’ll conclude with a few of Jack’s more 
notable quips that reflect deeper truth and must never be lost in 
Oregon’s appellate courts. 
First, when you don’t know the answer to a legal problem, admit it. 
Or, as Jack expresses true uncertainty in prefacing a question at oral 
argument, “I ask because I really don’t know.” 
Second, be gracious when you’re reversed or, worse still, when 
you’re truly schooled by a reviewing court. Or, as Jack would never 
say, “What are we, chopped liver?” 
Third, admit it when you’ve made a mistake and be willing to learn 
from your mistakes. Or, as Jack occasionally would exclaim, “I should 
have had a V-8!” 
Fourth, be gentle with your colleagues when they stray from the path 
of reason. Above all, don’t use this snarky line from the Roman author 
Aulus Gellius, “I see the beard and cloak, but I do not yet see the 
philosopher.”4 Be assured, Jack never did that. 
2 Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 837, 872–74 (2011). 
3 DOUGLAS HYDE & BREANDÁN CONAIRE, LANGUAGE, LORE, AND LYRICS: ESSAYS 
AND LECTURES 73 (1st ed. 1986). 
4 2 AULUS GELLIUS, ATTIC NIGHTS 157 (Loeb Classical Library ed., John C. Rolfe 
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1927). 
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And, finally, revel in the daily rhythm of judging and in the privilege 
of doing the people’s work with wonderful colleagues. Or, as Jack often 
has said with feeling at the end of a long day on the bench, “And a good 
time was had by all!” 
I can’t wait to read Jack’s next chapter, whatever the subject may be. 
As a wise person once said, “Thank you for everything forever.” 
